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Forecast errors are large in the recently acceded Member States and the mistakes have a 
similar order of magnitude in the Commission services’ forecasts, Consensus Forecasts and 
projections made by national authorities.  The prediction mistakes cannot be attributed to 
bias or autocorrelation.  Volatility in the economic developments and data revisions 
creating uncertainty on the state of the economy appear the main explanation for the 
difficulty to make good forecasts.  Prediction mistakes for GDP growth lead to wrong 
projections for general government balances through the operation of the automatic 
stabilisers, but errors in the discretionary part of the government balance are the largest 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
As policy making and the implementation of decisions take time, forecasts can contribute 
to improve the quality of the measures taken.  This is of particular relevance for fiscal 
policy where the budget is based on economic projections and as a consequence also the 
ensuing policy stance and eventually the actual level of the government balance.  In order 
to make good policy or formulate appropriate advice, the forecasts should be as reliable as 
possible.   
 
With the revision of the Stability and Growth Pact, the importance of high-quality 
economic forecasts has increased further.  First, the medium-term objective for the 
government balance is among other things determined by the outlook for potential growth.  
Second, the requirement to make a greater fiscal adjustment effort in (projected) good 
times has gained prominence in the preventive arm of the Pact.  Finally, under the 
corrective arm of the Pact, the adjustment path is now explicitly based on the economic 
outlook.  The growth forecasts contained in the Council recommendation on the 
elimination of the excessive deficit are the reference against which unforeseeable growth 
developments are to be assessed (European Council (2005)).  The Commission services’ 
forecasts play a key role in this context. 
 
The first objective of this note is to examine for the recently acceded Member States the 
accuracy of the economic forecasts produced by the Commission services and compare 
them with some available alternatives, like those produced by Consensus Forecasts, by the 
national authorities in the pre-accession economic programmes and in their successor the 
convergence programmes, as well with some naïve forecasts.  The focus is on GDP growth 
and the government balance.  The quality of the Commission services’ forecasts for the 
new Member States is also compared with those for the old Member States (the latter has 
been extensively assessed by Keereman (1999)). 
 
The second objective is to examine if the impact of the economic outlook and the 
associated forecast errors on the budgetary stance observed in the old Member States 
(Larch and Salto (2005), Martinez Mongay (2003)) is the same in the new Member States.  
More specifically, it will analysed if an optimistic assessment of the economic situation 
leads to an easier budgetary stance. 
 
The recently acceded Member States went trough a painful transition process from a 
planned economy to a market economy which changed also the framework and statistical 
apparatus for economic analysis.  In consequence, data availability and quality is not of the 
same standards as in other countries and comparability of data is hampered by definitional 
modifications.  It makes forecasting difficult and the results presented in this note should 
be interpreted always with these transition issues in mind.  
 
In the next section a brief account is given of the evolving approach to forecasting of the 
recently acceded Member States by the Commission services.  The sample data used for 
the analysis is described in section III.  The main characteristics of the forecast errors are 
given in section IV with a further quality check of the Commission services’ projections in 
the following section.  The size of the prediction mistake is related to volatility and data 
revision in section VI.  The impact of forecast errors on fiscal policy is assessed in section 
VII.  Section XIII summarises the main conclusions. 
 
   - 2 - 
II.  ECONOMIC FORECASTS FOR THE NEW MEMBER STATES AT THE COMMISSION 
 
The European Commission has since long made macroeconomic forecasts.  The focus is on 
the Member States of the European Union, the euro area and a few big countries (the 
United States, Japan), as well as some important international variables like the oil price, 
world trade and world GDP.  The older the Member State, the longer and more 
comprehensive are the forecast series for that country.  Already before accession on 1 May 
2004, the European Commission started with economic predictions for the recently 
acceded Member States, but the coverage of the macroeconomic variables was not as wide 
as for the old Member States.  Until end 1996, the recently acceded countries were not 
recognised as a group, but forecasts for GDP growth and international trade were made to 
feed world tables. 
 
Country forecasts for Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia were published for the first time in October 1996 in European 
Economy – Supplement C “Economic Reform Monitor”, which included also other 
countries (e.g. the future Member States Bulgaria and Romania).  Cyprus and Malta were 
added in autumn 2000.  The Supplements to European Economy were discontinued and 
from April 2002 “Enlargement Papers” contained the predictions for the 10 countries.   
From autumn 2003, forecasts for old and new Member States were published together in 
“European Economy” and the new Member States seized to be considered “external 
environment” for the European Union.   
 
The approach to forecasting is basically the same as the one for the old Member States 
(described in Keereman (1999)), but less use is make of econometric models. There are 
two forecast rounds per year (spring and autumn) and also the time horizon is the same: 
forecasts are made for the current year and the next and in autumn an additional year is 
added.  The focus is on annual predictions, but for inflation and GDP also quarterly 
profiles are made.  For the recently acceded countries, the latter have been gradually 
included from autumn 2003 for the harmonised index of consumer prices and from spring 
2004 for quarterly GDP.   
 
Like of the old Member States, forecasts (box 2.1 in European Economy (European 
Commission, 2005a)) are made under the hypothesis of unchanged policies, which is of 
particular relevance for budgetary projections.  Exchange rates are not forecast, but based 
of technical assumptions.  Depending on the currency, its value is set in accordance with 
purchasing power parity
1 or as a function of the exchange rate regime to which it belongs.  
Interest rates are fixed to reflect the price stability objective of monetary policy.   
 
 
III.  MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE DATA 
 
Compared to old Member States, there is less experience in economic forecasting for the 
recently acceded countries which went furthermore through a radical transformation 
process.  Hence, time series are short and in the interpretation of the results more than the 
usual attention has to be paid to characteristics of the sample data with respect to timing, 
definitions, methodological changes, data revision and availability of information.  This of 
particular relevance when comparing the Commission services’ with Consensus Forecasts 
which is a private company and the national authorities represented by the pre-accession 
economic programmes and their successor the convergence programmes (PEP-CP). 
                                                 
1  While the same hypothesis as for old Member States, catching up is usually associated with a real 
appreciation so that the use of purchasing power parity may unduly influence the forecast.   - 3 - 
 
1.  Quality of the statistics, forecasts and realisations 
 
The selection of the series representing forecasts and outturns is not without importance as 
it might influence the size and the meaning of the forecast error (for a discussion see 
Keereman (1999)).  In order to examine the sensitivity of the forecast performance with 
respect to the time horizon, two types of forecasts and their associated outturns are 
analysed.  The current year forecast is concerned with the quality of the projection made in 
the beginning of the year (spring) for the same year, while the year ahead forecasts (made 
in autumn) deal with the following year.   
 
Figure 1: Publication dates of the forecasts 
Over time the forecast calendar of the 
Commission services has varied (see 
figure 1).  In the mid nineties, the spring 
forecasts were released rather late, in 
June; recently, April was the month for 
the publication.  The autumn forecasts 
were released between October and 
December.  Consensus Forecasts are 
more regularly updated based on 
contributions from some 8 to 25, 
depending on the size of the country, 
forecast institutions, mainly from the 
private sector.  The predictions are 
released in a bi-monthly publication.  In this study, the forecasts are selected from the May 
and November releases.  The first pre-accession economic programme was submitted in 
2001 to the Commission between May and October and the next two were due in August.  
After Accession the first convergence programme was transmitted to the Commission in 
May 2004 and at the end of the year an update was available.  In a forecast error 
comparison these timing difference have to be taken into account.  In spring, for example, 
Consensus has an information advantage over the Commission services which should 
reduce the prediction mistake.  The advantage is likely to be further accentuated by the lag 
between publication date (on which figure 1 is based) and the cut-of date for inclusion of 
information in the forecasts (see Annex A). 
 
Following Kenen and Schwarz (1986) and Artis (1988, 1996), Keereman (1999) the 
realisation data for the current year forecasts (“first available estimates”) are found in the 
Commission services’ spring forecasts following the year to be forecast.  The outturn data 
for the year ahead forecasts are taken from the Commission services’ autumn forecasts 
following on the year to be forecast (“first settled estimates”).  The use of first available 
estimates in the assessment of current year forecast accuracy is motivated by the greater 
attention usually attracted by first available estimates, compared to later revisions.  Indeed, 
a quick evaluation is necessary if a policy reaction is required.  The greater precision of the 
first settled estimates is an attractive feature and they have been used in the analysis of the 
year ahead forecasts. 
 
The definition of the variables may shift over time.  An important change has been the 
adaptation to the European System of National Accounts (“ESA95”).  This could lead to a 
difference between projection and outturn which cannot be qualified as a forecast error.  
With respect to GDP growth, no attempt has been made to correct for this.  The 
interpretation of the growth prediction error should not be too much affected to the extent 
























Spring forecasts  - 4 - 
selecting the outturn data from a release date which is not too distant from the moment the 
forecasts were produced, differences in statistical framework can be reduced.  One should 
be aware, however, that the closer the realisation data are to the year to be forecast, the less 
reliable they are and the more subject to revision.   
 
With respect to the general government balance as a percentage of GDP, definitional 
changes are more of a concern as they are likely to affect the ratio.  A case in point is the 
treatment of the pension reform, which is different across countries and changed over time.  
In some countries (Slovakia, the Baltic States) the deficit increasing costs of establishing a 
mandatory fully funded pension scheme are accounted for in the official statistics, while in 
other countries (Poland) this is not the case.  The Hungarian authorities choose to change 
the definition in 2005 and preferred to report their government balance excluding the cost 
of the pension reform
2.  This methodological change has been adjusted for by adding to the 
realisation data the estimated cost (0.9 % of GDP) of the pension reform. 
 
Table 1: Main characteristics of the sample data  
  CZ EE CY LV LT HU MT PL  SI  SK  Pooled 
GDP growth 
Commission             
Sample  95/04 95/04 01/04 95/04 95/04 95/04 01/04 95/04 95/04 95/04  - 
No  of  obs.  10  10 4 10  10  10 4 10  10  10  88 
Mean  value  1.99 5.28 2.92 5.49 4.80 3.81 0.52 4.16 3.70 4.34 3.95 
STD  2.13 3.27 1.08 2.75 3.79 1.29 1.04 1.96 0.87 1.74 1.99 
Consensus             
Sample  95/04 98/04  na  98/04 98/04 94/04  na  94/04 95/04 95/04  - 
No of obs.  10  7  na  7  7  11  na  11  10  10  73 
PEP-CP             
Sample  01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04  - 
No  of  obs.  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  40 
Government balance as % of GDP 
Commission             
Sample  01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04  - 
No  of  obs.  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  40 
Mean  value  -6.97 1.57 -4.28 -1.72 -2.00 -6.22 -7.00 -4.15 -2.18 -4.90 -3.79 
STD  4.11 1.15 1.50 0.92 0.35 2.16 1.88 0.50 0.28 1.78 1.46 
Consensus              
Sample  00/04  na na na na  00/04  na  00/04  na na  - 
No  of  obs.  5 na  na  na  na 5 na 5 na  na  15 
PEP-CP             
Sample  01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04 01/04  - 
No  of  obs.  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  40 
Sample and number of observations are based on current year errors; there is one observation less for the year 
ahead errors.  Mean value and standard deviation (STD) are based on the year ahead outturn data. 
 
2.  Some descriptive statistics 
 
Some elementary descriptive statistics concerning the sample (table 1) can be helpful in the 
interpretation of forecast errors, made by the Commission services (see also annex B), 
Consensus Forecasts and the national authorities.  Availability of comparable data for the 
recently acceded countries is limited as their economies in the transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy went through a series of shocks.  GDP forecasts by the 
Commission and Consensus Economics begin mostly in the mid nineties; only 4 years are 
available for the national authorities (based on the pre-accession economic programmes 
and their successor the convergence programmes).  Predictions for government balances 
start only in 2000 or 2001 (Commission services, national authorities).  In Consensus 
Forecasts public finance forecasts are limited to the three big new Member States and the 
                                                 
2  Up to the March 2007 fiscal notification Eurostat permits to exclude the costs of the fully funded 
pension scheme from the government balance (STAT/04/30 of 2 March 2004 and STAT/04/117 of 23 
September 2004).    - 5 - 
definition of government is not comparable so that no further attention is paid to these 
predictions.   
 
The mean value (MV) gives an idea about the order of magnitude of a variable.  The more 
volatile a variable, the more difficult to forecast in general.  A measure for this is the 
standard deviation (STD).  Note, however, that variables can move in large swings 
producing a high value for the standard, but to the extent that the swing is regular, the 
increased difficulty to predict is questionable.  An alternative measure for volatility would 
be the coefficient of variation, which divides the standard deviation by the mean value and 
thus reflects the relative size of the error.  As the focus is on how many percentage points a 
growth rate or a deficit ratio has been over- or underestimated, the relevant concept is the 
simple standard deviation. 
 
The fastest growth and the largest swings in it have been observed in the Baltic states, 
while Slovenia is the more stable economy (figure 2 and 3).  The biggest government 
deficits have been observed in the four large central European countries and Malta, usually 
associated with large standard deviations but not in Poland. 
 
 
IV.  MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FORECAST ERRORS 
 
1.  The interpretation of the error statistics 
 
The forecast error (e) is defined as the forecast (F) minus the realisation (R): 
 
                        e = F – R      
 
Hence, a positive error indicates overestimation of growth or the government balance; the 
latter is equivalent to underestimation of the deficit.  The mean absolute error (MAE) gives 
a good idea of the average order of magnitude of the mistake as it avoids that positive and 
negative errors may offset each other which could give a flattering picture of forecast 
accuracy.  The mean error (ME) gives the average over- or underestimation and it can be 
tested if it significantly different from zero. 
 
The value of a forecast should not only be assessed in terms of its own errors, but 
compared to naïve or easily available alternatives.  Two easily available alternatives are the 
“no change forecast” and the “average forecast”.  If these easily available alternatives 
perform systematically better than the Commission approach to forecasting, a 
straightforward improvement of the accuracy is offered.   
 
The THEIL1-statistic is the ratio between the root mean squared error of the Commission 
services’ forecast to the root mean squared error of the “no change forecast”, while 
THEIL2 refers to the ratio between the root mean squared errors of the Commission 
services forecast and the “average forecast”.  The smaller the ratio the higher the quality of 
the Commission services’ forecast compared to the naïve alternative.  If the THEIL-
statistics are large than one, the competing forecasts are better.     - 6 - 
The Commission services’ projections are also put against those of other forecasters, but 
here comparisons are less straightforward because of differences in the forecasting process 
or period covered (see section III and table 1). 
 
Table 2: Main characteristics of forecast errors - GDP growth  
  CZ EE CY LV LT HU MT PL  SI  SK  Pooled 
Current year 
Commission             
No  of  obs.  10  10 4 10  10  10 4 10  10  10  88 
MAE  1.44 2.23 0.28 2.71 2.36 0.95 2.25 1.03 0.71 1.02 1.53 
ME  0.80 -0.11 -0.03 -0.31 -0.44 -0.27 2.20  0.07  0.19 -0.98 -0.02 
Signif α=0 (bias)  0.21  0.92 nr 0.76  0.68  0.49 nr 0.88  0.51  0.04  0.93 
THEIL1  0.87 0.66 0.24 1.02 0.75 0.78 1.06 0.84 0.80 1.14 0.81 
THEIL2  0.88 1.08 0.38 0.94 0.95 0.81 1.96 0.70 1.19 0.88 0.89 
Consensus             
No of obs.  10  7  na  7  7  11  na  11  10  10  73 
MAE  1.20  1.41 na 2.03  2.27  0.76 na 0.97  0.79  1.15  1.24 
ME  0.51  0.24 na -0.97  -0.13  -0.07 na -0.18  0.35  -1.15  -0.16 
Signif α=0 (bias)  0.37  0.75 na 0.25  0.92  0.83 na 0.64  0.23  0.01  0.43 
PEP-CP             
No  of  obs.  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  40 
MAE  0.70 0.65 0.38 1.50 1.45 0.77 1.56 0.62 0.88 0.68 0.92 
ME  -0.20 -0.60 0.28 -1.50 -1.30 0.47 1.35 -0.02 0.38 -0.68 -0.18 
Signif α=0 (bias)  nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr  0.36 
Year ahead 
Commission             
No  of  obs.  9 9 4 9 9 9 4 9 9 9  80 
MAE  1.68 2.67 1.08 2.98 3.11 1.17 2.88 1.19 1.02 1.02 1.87 
ME  1.19 0.09 0.33 -1.62  -0.71  -0.06 2.88 0.37 0.27 -0.58 0.04 
Signif α=0 (bias)  0.14  0.95 nr 0.16  0.63  0.91 nr 0.54  0.54  0.20  0.89 
THEIL1  1.05 0.84 0.85 0.78 0.89 0.85 1.14 0.81 0.88 0.79 0.87 
THEIL2  1.18 1.19 1.26 1.30 1.15 1.06 3.55 0.89 1.46 0.79 1.03 
Consensus             
No of obs.  9  6  na  6  6  10  na  11  9  9  66 
MAE  1.53  2.00 na 2.70  3.43  0.95 na 1.31  0.99  0.92  1.57 
ME  1.09  0.03 na -1.50  -0.30  -0.04 na -0.19  0.23  -0.76  -0.12 
Signif α=0 (bias)  0.15  0.98 na 0.22  0.89  0.92 na 0.70  0.56  0.04  0.66 
PEP-CP             
No  of  obs.  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  30 
MAE  1.17 0.43 1.80 1.67 2.30 1.23 2.10 0.70 1.27 0.77 1.34 
ME  0.37 -0.17 1.80 -1.67 -2.30 0.90 2.10 0.03 0.80 -0.70 0.12 
Signif α=0 (bias)  nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr  0.71 
MAE: mean absolute error; ME: mean error; na: not available; nr: not relevant (not enough data). 
Signif α=0: the significance level of the t-statistic for the coefficient α=0 in the regression e = α + µ  where e is 
the forecast error.  Numbers above 0.05 indicate absence of bias at the 5 % significance level. 
 
2.  Forecast errors in GDP growth 
 
Taken together the mean absolute error in the recently acceded countries is 1.53 % in the 
period 1995-2004 for forecasts made by the Commission services’ in spring for the 
ongoing year ranging from 0.71 % in Slovenia to 2.71 % in Latvia (excluding Cyprus and 
Malta where the period covered is too different from the other countries, table 2).  The 
mean absolute error for the ten as whole widens to 1.87 % for the year ahead forecasts.  In 
general, there does not appear to be a significant bias in the prediction, except in Slovakia 
for the current year forecasts where growth was systematically underestimated except in 
1999 and 2000 (figure 2).  Underestimation was also generally observed in the Baltic states, 
in particular since 2000 (figure 2 and 3).  By contrast, Czech and Maltese growth was 
considerably overestimated, but not significant in a statistical sense (table 2).  The 
overestimation of Czech growth was mainly due to an incorrect assessment of the severity 
of the recession in 1997/98.  It is a general observation (figure 2 and 3) that the largest 
GDP growth mistakes are made at turning points, in particular a recession is seen too mild 
(beside the Czech Republic in 1997/98, also the Baltic states in 1999).    - 7 - 
 
Table 3: Main characteristics of forecast errors – Government balance as % of GDP  
  CZ EE CY LV LT HU MT PL  SI  SK  Pooled 
Current year 
Commission             
No  of  obs.  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  40 
MAE  3.40 1.38 0.95 0.75 0.15 1.67 1.80 1.45 0.30 1.32 1.32 
ME  -0.10 -1.38 0.65 -0.75 -0.15 1.67 1.45 -0.20 0.30 0.08 0.16 
Signif α=0 (bias)  nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr  0.62 
THEIL1  0.60 1.61 0.61 1.08 0.40 0.67 0.71 1.85 1.10 0.61 0.68 
THEIL2  1.12 2.00 1.00 1.50 0.55 1.25 1.43 2.11 0.61 0.93 0.64 
Consensus (not further examined due to lack of data) 
PEP-CP             
No  of  obs.  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  40 
MAE  2.27 1.35 0.80 0.77 0.33 1.14 1.16 0.55 0.06 1.30 0.97 
ME  1.12 -1.35 0.30 -0.42 -0.18 1.09 1.16 0.15 -0.06 0.25 0.21 
Signif α=0 (bias)  nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr  0.37 
Year ahead 
Commission             
No  of  obs.  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  40 
MAE  2.55 1.65 1.53 1.23 0.33 2.05 1.77 0.98 0.78 1.02 1.39 
ME  0.65 -1.55 1.38 -0.83 -0.33 2.05 1.48 -0.43 0.78 0.08 0.33 
Signif α=0 (bias)  nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr  0.31 
THEIL1  0.86 1.20 1.08 0.95 0.57 1.18  1.1  1.69 0.98 0.68 0.99 
THEIL2  0.97 2.07 1.71 1.62 1.42 1.55 1.42 2.31 3.72 0.83 0.66 
Consensus (not further examined due to lack of data) 
PEP-CP             
No  of  obs.  3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3  30 
MAE  3.60 2.23 2.20 1.53 0.27 2.70 2.31 0.33 0.70 1.08 1.70 
ME  1.67 -2.23 2.20 -0.20 0.00 2.70 1.84 -0.13 0.70 0.39 0.69 
Signif α=0 (bias)  nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr  0.11 
MAE: mean absolute error; ME: mean error; na: not available; nr: not relevant (not enough data). 
Signif α=0: the significance level of the t-statistic for the coefficient α=0 in the regression e = α + µ  where e is 
the forecast error.  Numbers above 0.05 indicate absence of bias at the 5 % significance level. 
THEIL1&2: root mean squared error of Commission services’ forecast divided by root mean squared error of 
naïve forecast (previous realisation and realised period average, respectively); numbers below 1 suggest 
superiority of Commission services’ forecasts. 
 
The Commission services’ forecasts perform on the whole better than naïve alternatives, 
but not a lot.  In some cases (Czech Republic, Latvia, Malta, Slovakia) extrapolating last 
year’s growth (Theil1) is better than forecasts based on the Commission services’ approach.  
The quality of naïve alternatives improves with the lengthening of the forecast horizon as 
less information is available.  Using the average growth rate as the year ahead forecast 
(Theil2), would even have outperformed the Commission services for the ten countries as a 
whole.  It should be realised, however, that predictions based on the average growth rate 
are not as naïve as it looks like, because the average growth rate is calculated ex post.  
Hence, it is a projection too, with estimating difficulties akin to potential growth 
calculations.   
 
Compared to Consensus Forecasts, the Commission services’ prediction errors are in 
general larger, but they remain of a similar order of magnitude.  It should be expected that 
Consensus Forecasts, which does not produce its own forecasts but calculates the average 
of forecasts made available by others, performs better.  Indeed, because of the law of large 
numbers, it is difficult to systematically beat the average (OECD (2000) versus Batchelor 
(2001), mimeo available in 2000).  Furthermore, the forecasts by Consensus are published 
in May and November, which is somewhat later than the Commission services and this, 
considering also the time lag between production and release of the forecasts, gives 
Consensus an information advantage (see figure 1).  Finally, the forecasting method may be 
part of the explanation.  For some variables, the Commission services use technical 
assumptions (e.g. exchange rates) or work with the unchanged-policy assumption (e.g.   - 8 - 
fiscal stance).  To the extent that the contributors to Consensus Forecasts, for the larger part 
private market analysts, make true forecasts, the comparison is likely to be in its favour. 
 





































































































































































































































The pre-accession economic programmes and their successor the convergence programmes 
cover the period 2001-2004 and the GDP forecast errors are smaller than in the 
Commission services’ projections and Consensus Forecasts.  The period covered is, 
however, very different and this should be borne in mind when making a comparison.  
 
3.  Forecast errors in the general government balance  
 
Due to data revisions, changes in definitions (see table 4) and the short period covered, the 
error statistics for the general government balances should be interpreted with cautious and 
do not necessarily present a good guide to the size of future errors.  On the whole the 
prediction mistake is relatively large, with a mean absolute error of 1.32 % of GDP for the 
current year and 1.39 % of GDP for the year ahead.     - 9 - 
 










































































































































































































































The biggest error has been noted in the Czech Republic, but this is largely due to a 
methodological change.  Imputations of state guarantees (about 7 % of GDP) have been 
included in the 2003 government balance in 2004, which was an unknown obligation at the 
moment of the forecast.  Similarly a large mistake was made in Hungary in 2002 when at 
the end of that year, debt assumptions and a reclassification (about 3 % of GDP) affected 
the government balance.  Debt assumptions in 2003 (about 3.2 % of GDP) related to the 
ship yards restructuring influenced the fiscal error in Malta.  To a minor extent (0.2 % of 
GDP), a reclassification of government funds affected the Slovene accounts in 2003. More 
one-off operations took place in the new Member States (see table 4), which did not 
directly affect the projection error as defined here (realisation data are taken from the 
spring or autumn forecasts of the following year), but they created difficult forecast 
circumstances. 
 
There does not appear to be a bias in the government balance forecasts, but here one is not 
on firm grounds because the sample is very small.  In general, the government balance was 
underestimated in the Baltic states and Poland, while overestimated in Malta, Cyprus and 
Hungary (or in other words the deficit was underestimated, given the definition of the   - 10 - 
forecast error, in these 3 Member States); in the other countries one remained closer to the 
observed result. 
 
Table 4: Government accounts: major one-off operations in the recently acceded Member States  
% of GDP  2001 2002 2003 2004  Main characteristic of operation  
(underlined bold numbers are affecting the forecast error; +: deficit reducing) 
-2.0        Classification of CKA (Czech Consolidation Agency) into general government 
   -6.0    Imputation of a state guarantee in favour of CSOB (Czechoslovak Commercial Bank) for 
the bad debts of IPB ( Investment and Post Bank) which it tool over 
   -0.8   
Imputation of a state guarantee in favour of CSOB to cover Slovakia’s debt towards 
CSOB (related to debt under the previous regime); on 24.12.04 Czech Republic won an 
international arbitration proceeding reversing the deficit impact (see also Slovakia) 
      -0.5  Capital injection to Aero (state-owned company) linked to the exit of Boeing 
Czech 
Republic 
    - 0 . 8   Imputation of capital transfer related to guarantees for the banking sector granted in the 
mid-1990s (reclassified to 1997) 
Lithuania      0.6  1.0  Restitution of confiscated real estate and lost rouble savings 
  -3.0    
Debt assumption of State Railway Company and Privatisation Agency; classification of 
state companies into general government  
    -1.0    VAT reimbursement (change from cash to accruals accounting)  Hungary 
    - 0 . 7   1 3
th month of public salaries not shifted to 2005 
Malta     -3.2    Debt assumption related to ship yard restructuring 
-0.2 -0.2 -0.2    Inclusion of Capital Fund (financing part of PAYG pension) and Restitution Fund 
(reimbursement of confiscated property) into general government  
-1.1        Payments by Restitution Fund  Slovenia 
    -0.7    Exclusion of financial assets of Agency for Payments (enterprises) after discontinuation 
Slovakia      (-1.9)  On 24.12.04 Slovakia lost an international arbitration proceeding (year of deficit increase 
uncertain); see Czech Republic 
    -2.1      Debt cancellations of the Russian federation and developing countries 
 
The Commission services’ predictions compare favourably to naïve forecasts based on 
extrapolating the recent government balance (Theil1 less than 1, table 3), but the difference 
is small, in particular for the year ahead.  Naïve forecasts for the 10 recently acceded 
Member States as a whole based on the average deficit in the group (Theil2) are also less 
good than those made by the Commission services.  However, at the country level, using 
the average government balance generally appears to result in better forecast than those 
provided by the Commission services.  The same consideration applies as in the case of the 
GDP forecasts, namely that predictions based on the average are not that naïve, because at 
the moment the forecast has to be produced, the average is unknown.  Hence, the pooled 
Theil2 statistic is probably the more relevant so that there is value in the Commission 
services’ budgetary forecasts.   
 
A comparison with the pre-accession economic programmes and their successor the 
convergence programmes is difficult because of differences in timing.  The national 
authorities made their forecasts after the Commission services’ (pre-accession economic 
programmes in August 2001-03 and convergence programmes in August and end 
2004/beginning 2005).  The better result for the national authorities in the case of the 
current year forecast errors, has to be seen in the light of their information advantage.  
Similarly, different information sets are part of the explanation why for the year ahead 
forecasts the Commission services do better. 
 
 
V.  FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE COMMISSION SERVICES ‘FORECASTS 
 
In predicting the economy of the recently acceded Member States, large errors are made by 
the three forecasters assessed in the previous section.  In this section the question will be 
addressed if there is unexploited information in the past prediction mistakes committed by 
the Commission services which could be used to improve its projections. 
   - 11 - 
1.  Absence of persistence of forecast errors 
 
Absence of correlation between prediction errors is a desirable property.  It means that 
once an error is made, it does not feed into the next forecast.  It disappears or the next error 
bears no relation to previous mistakes.  If a systematic relation between errors would exist, 
it could be exploited to improve the forecast. 
 
Table 5: Absence of persistence in the Commission forecast errors 
GDP growth 
Gov. balance 
as % of GDP 
  CZ EE CY LV LT HU MT PL  SI  SK  Pooled  Pooled 
Current year               
Signif ρ1=0  0.12 0.22  nr  0.98 0.46 0.08  nr  0.58 0.19 0.29 0.53  0.67 
Signif ρ2=0  0.08 0.17  nr  0.08 0.34 0.09  nr  0.62 0.41 0.55 0.16  0.73 
Year ahead               
Signif ρ1=0  0.18 0.22  nr  0.77 0.63 0.51  nr  0.28 0.74 0.46 0.37  0.98 
Signif ρ2=0  0.23 0.21  nr  0.19 0.65 0.69  nr  0.53 0.92 0.39 0.23  0.91 
nr: not relevant (not enough data).  The country detail for the government balance is not given due to insufficient data. 
The test for serial correlation is based on the Ljung-Box Q statistic, which is asymptotically distributed as χ
2.  The significance 
level of the null hypothesis of absence of autocorrelation up to two lags is reported.  Numbers above 0.05 indicate no serial 
correlation at the 5 % significance level. 
 
The null hypothesis of no serial correlation among the forecast errors can be tested with the 
Ljung-Box Q-statistic.  The significance levels of absence of correlation up to two orders, 
are reported in table 5.  Serial correlation among forecast errors is not significant, neither 
for GDP growth nor for the government balance, always bearing in mind the limitations of 
the data sample. 
 
2.  Efficiency of the Commission services’ forecasts 
 
Forecasts are efficient if all information available in the data is used.  Weak efficiency can 
be tested with the realisation-forecast equation 
 
R = α + βF + µ 
 
where the null hypothesis is 
 
Ho: α = 0 and β = 1 
 
If  α  is significantly different form zero and  β significantly different from unity, the 
forecast is correlated with the forecast error and the forecast can be improved exploiting 
this information.  In table 6 both the probability values for the restrictions imposed on the 
coefficients separately (t-test) and jointly (F-test) are given.   
 
Bearing in mind the small data set, the Commission services’ forecasts appear efficient in 
the sense that there is no easy way to reduce the admittedly sometimes very large errors 
made in particular years.  Even for the year ahead prediction mistakes in GDP growth, 
where the test statistics suggest correlation between the forecast and the forecast error, 
using this information will still produce a large error as implied by the weak explanatory 
power of the estimated equation (low R
2).  The yearly government balances are forecast in 
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Table 6: Efficiency of the Commission forecasts 
GDP growth 
Gov. balance 
as % of GDP 
  CZ EE CY LV LT HU MT PL  SI  SK  Pooled  Pooled 
Current year 
α  -0.48  5.41 nr 1.91  1.63  1.32 nr 0.38  3.48  0.81  0.84  0.14 
Signif α=0  0.76  0.24 nr 0.54  0.56  0.19 nr 0.81  0.14  0.59  0.21  0.82 
β  0.90 -0.14  nr  0.63 0.69 0.67  nr  0.90 0.03 1.04 0.79  1.08 
Signif β=1  0.82  0.23 nr 0.58  0.64  0.24 nr 0.76  0.12  0.91  0.19  0.58 
Signif α=0, β=1  0.47  0.47 nr 0.82  0.83  0.39 nr 0.94  0.22  0.15  0.42  0.76 
R
2  0.34  0.00 nr 0.11  0.13  0.45 nr 0.51  0.00  0.50  0.22  0.59 
DW  1.04  2.49 nr 1.21  1.56  2.54 nr 1.36  2.06  0.91  1.78  2.11 
Year ahead 
α  0.57  15.80  nr 5.07  8.80  2.42 nr 0.53  4.79  -0.80  2.46  0.23 
Signif α=0  0.80  0.03 nr 0.09  0.12  0.27 nr 0.83  0.03  0.68  0.01  0.72 
β  0.45  -1.96 nr 0.11  -0.98  0.37 nr 0.80  -0.27  1.37  0.37  1.16 
Signif β=1  0.43  0.03 nr 0.19  0.13  0.27 nr 0.70  0.03  0.47  0.01  0.32 
Signif α=0, β=1  0.26  0.07 nr 0.16  0.27  0.51 nr 0.77  0.06  0.35  0.03  0.36 
R
2  0.06  0.33 nr 0.00  0.09  0.07 nr 0.27  0.05  0.54  0.03  0.58 
DW  1.07  1.66 nr 1.49  1.41  1.54 nr 1.18  1.27  1.76  1.55  2.19 
nr: not relevant (not enough data).  The country detail for the government balance is not given due to insufficient data. 
α and β: coefficients in the regression R = α + βF + µ  
Signif (.): significance level of the t-statistic (single test) or F-statistic (joint test) of the null hypothesis; numbers above 0.05 
indicate that the null hypothesis can be accepted at the 5 % significance level.. 
 
 
VI.  VOLATILITY AND DATA REVISION 
 
Although the Commission services’ forecasts for the recently acceded countries meet the 
basic quality requirements, the prediction errors remain large as well as those of Consensus 
Forecasts and the national authorities.  In search for an explanation, the volatility of the 
economy and data revisions in the new Member States appear to make forecasting 
particularly difficult resulting in big mistakes. 
 
 
1.  Relative importance of bias and volatility 
 









one can have an idea of the relative importance of bias and volatility in the prediction 
mistake (table 7).  The systematic part of the mean squared error is the bias (the mean 
forecast error) and it should be as small as possible.  The other parts of the mean squared 
error are related to volatility and are more difficult to avoid.  The variance component is 
zero if the standard deviation of the series is correctly forecast.  The covariance component 
is zero if the correlation coefficient is one implying that the shape and turning points are 
perfectly predicted. 
 
From table 7 it appears that instability in the underlying series accounts for the larger part 
of the GDP forecast errors: in general, more than 75 % of the growth forecast error, both in 
the current year and in the year ahead, can be attributed to volatility.  Malta, where GDP 
growth has been considerable overestimated in the short period for which data are 
available (figure 2 and 3), is a notable exception.  With respect to government balances, the 
mean plays a more prominent role in the total mean squared error.  However, the sample 
for government balances is particularly small which dampens the variance.     - 13 - 
Table 7: Theil’s decomposition of the mean squared forecast error 
(% of total error)  CZ EE CY LV LT HU MT PL  SI  SK  Pooled 
GDP growth 
Current year             
Mean  16.5 0.1 0.6 1.0 1.9 5.4  53.5 0.3 5.0  38.1  12.2 
Variance  15.4 30.0 57.4 24.7 25.3  0.0  1.4  8.8  9.0 12.8 18.5 
Co-variance  68.1 69.9 42.0 74.3 72.8 94.6 45.1 91.0 86.0 49.1 69.3 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Year ahead             
Mean  37.8  0.2 15.9 17.5  2.4  0.1 89.2 10.5 17.9 13.7 20.5 
Variance  11.5 34.9 23.4  7.2 39.0  9.5  1.3 14.8  2.2 35.0 17.9 
Co-variance  50.8 64.9 60.7 75.3 58.6 90.5  9.5 74.7 79.9 51.3 61.6 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Government balance as % of GDP 
Current year             
Mean  0.1 61.6 26.8 68.2 64.3 56.4 36.5  1.3 85.7  0.2 40.1 
Variance  30.9  6.5 15.6  4.3 21.2 24.0 35.7 16.9  0.1 57.5 21.3 
Co-variance  69.0 31.9 57.5 27.5 14.5 19.6 27.9 81.7 14.2 42.3 38.6 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Year ahead             
Mean  31.9 43.6 42.6 21.2 44.1 52.7 66.3  5.4 95.5  5.5 40.9 
Variance  32.3 13.1 15.3 18.8 37.4  8.0  8.9 94.6  2.4 63.7 29.5 
Co-variance  35.8 43.3 42.1 59.9 18.4 39.4 24.8  0.0  2.1 30.8 29.7 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Decomposition of the mean squared error (MSE): 






















































: , R F average forecast and realisation, respectively; CORR: correlation coefficient 
 
 
2.  Forecast error and volatility in old and recently acceded Member States 
 
On the whole the quality of the GDP forecasts made by the Commission services for the 
old Member States is much better than for the countries that joined the European Union on 
1 May 2004 (table 8):   
•  The mean absolute error observed in 1995-2004 is about double in size (0.72 % 
versus 1.53  % for current year forecasts and 0.99  % versus 1.87 %).  For the 
European Union as an aggregate the mean absolute error is only 0.36 % for the 
current year forecast and 0.59 % for the year ahead forecast (an improvement from 
0.53 % and 0.82 %, respectively, in the period 1969-1997
3, Keereman (1999)).   
•  The smallest mean forecast error is observed in the old Member States (Spain) and 
the largest in the new countries (Latvia, Lithuania).   
•  The largest overestimation occurred in a new Member State (Czech Republic), but 
the bias was not significant contrary to the, albeit smaller, overestimation in Italy 
(current year) or Germany (year ahead).  However, the largest underestimation 
occurred in an old Member State (Ireland) and the bias was significant.   
•  Compared to naïve alternatives (Theil1&2), the Commission services’ forecasts 
represent a clear value added for the old Member States (Ireland is an outlier), 





                                                 
3  The composition of the European Union changed so that the two samples are not totally comparable.   - 14 - 
The volatility of the economy appears to make forecasting more difficult.  Larger standard 
deviations in GDP growth are indeed associated with big mean absolute errors.  Linked to 
the transition process and the ongoing structural change, the economy of the recently 
acceded Member States is more volatile and more difficult to predict.  Slovenia had the 
lowest mean absolute error, but taking into account volatility, the performance of Slovakia 
and Poland is relatively better.  In the Baltic states the size of the forecast errors is very 
large, but appears acceptable from the perspective of volatility.   
 
To the extent that the economy of the new Member States over time stabilises, it can also 





Figure 4: Volatility and GDP forecast 
















































































3. Data  revision 
 
An economy may be difficult to predict, not only because of underlying volatility, but also 
because the data do not reflect well reality as it is costly and takes time to gather the 
statistics.  Furthermore, there are methodological changes which can directly affect the 
calculation of the prediction error
4, but more generally, add also to the information gap.  
With other words, the information set on which the forecasts are made is incomplete.  It 
makes the analysis flawed, forecasts error-prone and it can contribute to a higher volatility 
of the economy, because wrong decisions have been made by policy makers and economic 
agents.  The degree of data revision can be used as an indicator of the information gap or 
the difficulty to know what is really going on.  
The data revision between the first estimate (spring +1) and first settled estimate (autumn t 
+ 1) is not negligible as measured by the mean absolute revision (table 9).  However, the 
                                                 
4  To the extent that methodological revisions take place between the moment the forecast are made 
and the release of the outturn data, the prediction error is directly affected.  However, by minimising the 
distance between prediction moment and the publication of the realisation data (in this study: the year 
following on the year to be forecast), one reduces the risk that definitional changes distort the forecast error.   
Table 8: Forecast errors and volatility in old and recently acceded 
               Member States 
GDP growth  EU15  EU15  RAMS  EU15 RAMS EU15 RAMS 
(1995 - 2004)  Average  Pooled Minimum
a Maximum
a 
Current year            
No of obs.  10  150  88  150  80
a 150 80
 a 
MAE  0.36  0.72  1.53  0.28 (ES)  0.71 (SI)  2.17 (IE)  2.71 (LV) 
ME  0.16 -0.04 -0.02 -1.41  (IE)  -0.98  (SK)  0.45 (IT)  0.80 (CZ) 
Signif α=0 (bias)  0.31  0.62  0.93  0.05 0.04 0.02 0.21 
THEIL1 0.47  0.66  0.81  0.43 (ES)  0.66 (EE)  0.85 (EL)  1.14 (SK) 
THEIL2 0.61  0.50  0.89  0.47 (ES)  0.70 (PL)  0.94 (UK)  1.19 (SI) 
Year ahead            
No of obs.  10  150  80  150  72
a 150 72
 a 
MAE  0.59  0.99  1.87  0.39 (ES)  1.02 (SI,SK)  2.82 (IE)  3.11 (LT) 
ME  0.37  0.01  0.04  -2.22 (IE)  -1.62 (LV)  0.75 (DE)  1.19 (CZ) 
Signif α=0 (bias)  0.11  0.91  0.89  0.02 0.16 0.01 0.14 
THEIL1 0.70  0.86  0.87  0.58 (UK,ES)  0.78 (LV)  1.20 (IE)  1.05 (CZ) 
THEIL2 1.01  0.69  1.03  0.63 (PT)  0.79 (SK)  1.30 (IE)  1.46 (SI) 
Stand. deviation  0.76 1.27 1.99  0.55 (UK)  0.87 (SI)  2.63 (LU,IE)  3.79 (LT) 
a : Minimum and
 maximum calculated without Cyprus and Malta for which only 4 observations 
are available. 
MAE: mean absolute error; ME: mean error; Standard deviation: based on the year ahead 
outturn data. 
Signif α=0: the significance level of the t-statistic for the coefficient α=0 in the regression e = 
α + µ  where e is the forecast error.  Numbers above 0.05 indicate absence of bias at the 5 % 
significance level. 
THEIL1&2: root mean squared error of Commission services’ forecast divided by root mean 
squared error of naïve forecast (previous realisation and realised period average, respectively); 
numbers below 1 suggest superiority of Commission services’ forecasts.   - 15 - 
revision is not significant at the 5 % level.  There is little difference between the recently 
acceded Member States and the old Member States: the mean absolute GDP growth 
revision is about 0.30 percentage point and there is a small (non-significant) upward 
revision of about 0.08 percentage point.   
 
 
Figure 5: Information gap and GDP 







































































Mean absolute revision 





Over time large data revisions can occur suggesting that an information gap may exist at 
the moment the forecasts have to be made, contributing to the prediction mistake.  The 
upward revision between the first available and the “final” data is significant in a pooled 
regression and larger in the new Member States (0.22 and 0.38 percentage point, 
respectively).  The recently acceded countries are also characterised by a bigger mean 
absolute revision.  Taken together, the mean absolute revision for the new countries is 0.75 
versus 0.52 percentage points for the old Member States; the mean absolute revision in 
Luxemburg is, however, larger than in Estonia.   
 
With the improvement of the data quality and greater timeliness in the availability of the 
statistics, it is likely that data revisions can be reduced leading quicker to a clearer picture 
of the state of the economy so that also predictions mistakes could decline. 
 
 
VII.  THE IMPACT OF FORECAST ERRORS ON FISCAL POLICY 
 
Large forecast errors for GDP growth are made in the recently acceded countries.  In this 
section the relation between GDP growth and government balance prediction mistakes is 
assessed and in what direction does the causality run.  It is attempted also to find out to 
what extent growth surprises influence the government balance beyond the operation of the 
automatic stabilisers, with other words, if forecast errors affect discretionary fiscal policy.   
 
1.  Relation between GDP forecast errors and government balance errors 
 
It is difficult to know in which direction goes the causality: do GDP forecast errors cause 
prediction mistakes in the government balance or is it the other way around ?  In the 
absence of sufficient data for a formal statistical test of Granger-causality, a more 
judgmental approach has to be followed (Artis, 1999).  If one assumes that the causality 
runs from GDP to public finances, the operation of the automatic stabilisers and the fiscal 
authorities’ reaction function should determine the transmission mechanism.  In the event 
of an adverse unexpected shock (producing overestimation of GDP), the automatic 
Table 9: Data revision in old and recently acceded Member States 
GDP growth  EU15  EU15  RAMS  EU15 RAMS EU15 RAMS 
(1995 – 2004)  Average  Pooled Minimum  Maximum 
First available estimate (spring t + 1) compared to first settled estimate (autumn t + 1) 
No of obs.  10  150  90  150  80
a 150 80
 a 
MAR  0.12  0.28  0.27  0.01 IT  0.05 PL  1.27 IE  0.67 EE 
MR  -0.02  0.07  0.08  -0.05 DE  -0.07 SK  0.45 IE  0.27 EE 
Signif α=0  0.71  0.16  0.13  0.44 0.50 0.40 0.39 
First available estimate (spring t + 1) compared to “final” data (July 2005) 
No of obs.  10  150  90  150  80
a 150 80
 a 
MAR  0.14  0.52  0.75  0.19 IT  0.08 PL  1.78 LU  1.31 EE 
MR  0.08  0.22  0.38  -0.20 DE  -0.45 SK  0.67 LU  1.31 EE 
Signif α=0  0.30  0.00  0.00  0.19 0.09 0.37 0.00 
a : Minimum and
 maximum calculated without Cyprus and Malta for which only 5 observations 
are available. 
MAR: mean absolute revision; MR: mean revision (+: upward revision). 
Signif α=0: the significance level of the t-statistic for the coefficient α=0 in the regression r = 
α + µ  where r is the data revision.  Numbers above 0.05 indicate absence of revision at the 
5 % significance level.   - 16 - 
stabilisers will induce a deterioration of the fiscal account (leading to an underestimation 
of the government deficit).  The operation of the automatic stabilisers may be 
complemented by a discretionary easing of fiscal policy which would further worsen the 
deficit.  Given the definition of the prediction mistake used here (forecast minus 
realisation) and of the government balance (a deficit enters with a negative sign), it would 
imply a positive relation between GDP forecast errors and government balance forecast 
errors.   
 
On the other hand, in a Keynesian framework where fiscal policy influences demand, 
causality can run from government deficit to GDP.  In this case, unexpected government 
spending (underestimation of the deficit, in other words overestimation of the government 
balance) boosts demand (underestimation of GDP) and the relation between forecast errors 
on the government balance and GDP growth should be negative
5.   
 
The correlation coefficients between GDP and government deficit forecast errors (table 10) 
suggest that automatic stabilisers seem to govern the relation between GDP and deficit
6 
(similar to the situation in the old Member States, see Keereman (1999)).  A majority of 
positive correlation coefficients are observed, which are on the whole rather small inviting 
for prudence in the interpretation of the results, also bearing in mind the small sample.   
 
Table 10: Error correlation between GDP growth and government 
                balance 
CZ EE CY  LV  LT  HU  MT  PL  SI  SK  Pooled 
Current year (8/10) 
0.18  -0.01  0.50 0.58  -0.29 0.09 0.47 0.77 0.06 0.03 0.24 
Year ahead (7/10) 
0.26 0.47 0.78  0.85  -0.83  -0.40  0.27  0.89  0.84  -0.25  0.29 
Between brackets: number of positive correlations on total, pool excluded 
 
Within the automatic stabilisers framework, a negative correlation coefficient can also be 
rationalised.  It would mean that the underestimation of the government balance is not 
proportional to the underestimation of the growth.  This could happen if the operation of 
the automatic stabilisers proved to be weaker than when implicitly assumed at the moment 
when the forecasts were produced or if fiscal policy became easier than forecast and this 
effect dominated the operation of the automatic stabilisers.  Thus, the good growth 
surprises since 2000 (underestimation of growth) in Lithuania and Slovakia (see figures 2 
and 3) were accompanied by an underestimation of the government balance which was too 
small because automatic stabilisers functioned differently and/or the policy stance eased
7.  
Similarly, the growth disappointment in Hungary (see figures 2 and 3) in 2001 and 2003 
was not matched by a proportional overestimation of the government balance which could 
be related to weaker automatic stabilisers and/or a tighter budget so that fiscal 
consolidation proceeded
8.  
                                                 
5  A negative correlation can also appear for technical reasons as the GDP forecast error enters the 
calculation of the government balance error expressed in terms of GDP.  The explanation of the correlation is 
then of a technical nature and not based on an economic relationship.  Overestimation of nominal GDP will 
lower the GDP ratio suggesting underestimation of the government balance. 
6  It should be stressed that correlations do not say anything on the direction of causation.  If some 
form of causality is suggested, this is based on other considerations (i.e. an economic model).   
7  This behaviour justified the recommendation addressed to both countries on 5 July 2004 to use 
better than expected budget revenues for deficit reduction (Council opinion on the first Lithuanian 
convergence programme, Council recommendation on the elimination of the Slovakian excessive deficit). 
See 
website on the Stability and Growth Pact maintained by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/main_en.htm
.  
8  Progress in consolidation fell, however, short of what was required under the 5 July 2004 Council 
recommendation (Council decision of 18 January 2005 that Hungary had not taken effective action).   - 17 - 
 
2.  Impact of GDP forecast errors on government balance errors 
 
While in the previous section it was attempted to establish the direction of causality 
between growth and budgetary forecast errors, here the impact is estimated assuming that 
the basic causality runs from the business cycle to the budget.   
 
The government balance is equal to the structural balance and the part of the balance which 
is sensitive to the cycle.  If the budgetary sensitivity (σ) does not change over the forecast, 
the size of the cyclical fiscal forecast error (ε) can be estimated as follows
9: 
 
εt = σ (Ft – Rt)               with (Ft – Rt): the GDP growth forecast error 
 
Preliminary estimates (European Commission (2005b)) suggest a budgetary sensitivity to 
the cycle of 0.25 on average in the case of the new Member States which is much lower 
than the updated sensitivity of 0.50 for old Member States.  It permits to approximately 
calculate an order of magnitude for the cyclical and discretionary part in the fiscal forecast 
error.  The period covered is 2001-2004 which is very short and characterised by the new 
Member States’ adoption process of the ESA95 accounting rules.  The errors committed 
during this learning period are not necessarily a good guide for the future.   
 
Figure 6: Estimate of the cyclical dimension in the 
                 fiscal forecast error (2001-2004) 
For the new Member States as a whole, 
the cyclical part represents about 1/4 
(0.4  % of GDP) of the discretionary 
error in the Commission services’ 
forecasts (about 1.6  % of GDP, see 
figure 6) or about 20 % of the total fiscal 
forecast error.  There are, however, 
notable differences among countries.  In 
the Czech Republic, Malta and Hungary, 
countries with large fiscal forecast errors, 
mistakes in the discretionary fiscal sphere are more important.  However, not everything 
can be attributed to misjudging the fiscal stance or unforeseen discretionary policy 
measures.  Methodological changes play also a role as was the case in the Czech Republic 
where a 7 % of GDP government guarantee was included in the deficit in 2003.  Large 
growth mistakes have been made in Lithuania and Latvia with correspondingly a bigger 
share of the total fiscal forecast error explained by cyclical factors.  Also in Malta and 
Poland growth surprises had a large impact on the fiscal forecast errors. 
 
3.  Discretionary fiscal policy and forecast errors  
 
The impact of the forecast error (Ft – Rt) on the desired fiscal stance (S*t with * indicating 
a desired level) can be highlighted as follows: 
 
S*t = γ + θ (Ft – Rt)  
 
                                                 
9  For a similar approach but with a view to determine the structural part of the fiscal forecast error in 
order to calculate a safety margin with respect to the 3 % of GDP deficit ceiling under the Stability and 









CZ EE CY LV LT HU MT PL SI SK RAMS
GDP grow th (%) 
Government balance*
Cyclical impact*              
(budgetary sensitivity: 0.25)
Discretionary impact            
and other*
Mean absolute error 
(% of GDP, year ahead)
*Mean absolute errors are not additive   - 18 - 
Underlying this equation is a fiscal policy reaction function with the usual arguments of 
output stabilisation and budgetary consolidation.  Examples of such reaction functions can 
be found with Larch and Salto (2005), Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2003) and Bohn 
(1998), who analysed budgetary policy in some old Member or the US.  Larch and Salto 
(2005) examined the consequences of prediction mistakes around potential growth; in this 
paper the focus is on wrong projections for actual output.  Variables like the output gap, 
the deficit target or previous year’s debt typically enter the equation and are here 
represented by γ for simplicity and because the focus is on the impact (θ) of the forecast 
error on the fiscal stance. 
 
In which direction goes the impact of the growth forecast error (θ  > 0 or θ  < 0)?  It 
depends on the strongest component in the reaction function: output stabilisation or 
budgetary consolidation: 
•  If the policy rule is to realise a desired output growth, a foreseen too strong 
acceleration is counteracted by a tightening of the fiscal stance.  An overestimation 
of growth (Ft – Rt > 0) will sharpen the restrictive stance, leading to a positive 
coefficient (θ > 0).   
•  With budgetary consolidation the main preoccupation of the authorities, an 
overestimation of growth (Ft – Rt > 0) will lead to an easier budgetary stance, 
because the deficit target is assumed to be met thanks to good economic activity.  
This suggests a negative coefficient (θ < 0). 
 
As tightening policy is often costly in social and political terms, there may be a bias in the 
growth projections so that the cycle can be blamed if the policy goal is missed.  The bias 
will be different depending on the policy goal.  Systematic overestimation of growth would 
be the behaviour if budgetary consolidation is the declared policy objective.  With 
systematic underestimation of growth, one avoids to tighten when output stabilisation is 
important.  With respect to the recently acceded countries, this study did not find any 
significant bias (see table 2), but the forecast errors are large. 
 
In order to come to an empirical verification of the impact of forecast errors, a partial 
adjustment mechanism is introduced, reflecting that in the present period only a part of the 
desired adjustment is realised, because of inertia in the implementation of fiscal policy: 
 
St – St-1 = λ (S*t – St-1)            0 < λ < 1                   
 
The quicker the adjustment, the larger is the parameterλ.   
 
Substituting the policy reaction function into the adjustment mechanism, gives an equation 
ready to estimate the influence of the forecast error on the fiscal stance: 
 
St = α + β (Ft – Rt) + δ St-1               α = λγ +λθ (Rt – R
*
t)         β = λθ          δ = 1 – λ       
 
As in Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2003) the fiscal stance is represented by the 
primary balance.  A better alternative would be to use the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance as in Larch and Salto (2005), but data limitations prevent to do so for the new 
Member States.  Hence, some cyclical response may still be reflected in the equation, so 
that part of the deterioration of the primary balance is attributed to a policy action, while 
only the automatic stabilisers are at work.  This type of wrong attribution should be smaller 
than in the old Member States, because, as already indicated in the previous section, 
preliminary estimates for budgetary sensitivities suggest smaller values in the recently 
acceded countries compared to the old Member States.  It means a larger part of the actual   - 19 - 
government balance in the new Member States is explained by discretionary government 
action.  
 
Table 11: Prediction errors and the fiscal stance 
Commission services’ prediction errors (year ahead) 
Nat. auth. 
pred. errors 
  CZ EE CY LV LT HU MT PL  SI  SK  Pooled  Pooled 
No  of  obs  9 9 4 9 9 7 4 9 6 9  75  30 
α  -5.72  0.38 nr -1.12  -1.82  -0.25 nr -0.43 nr -3.26  -0.78  -0.74 
Signif α=0  0.05  0.33 nr  0.02  0.00  0.81 nr  0.30 nr  0.07  0.00  0.13 
β  0.46  -0.47 nr -0.63  -0.29  -0.60 nr  0.01 nr  0.19  -0.33  -0.49 
Signif β=0  0.47  0.00 nr  0.00  0.00  0.54 nr  0.96 nr  0.82  0.00  0.05 
δ  -0.27  0.53 nr  0.75  -0.18  0.43 nr  0.49 nr -0.06  0.39  0.44 
Signif δ=0  0.46  0.04 nr  0.01  0.28  0.29 nr  0.11 nr  0.86  0.00  0.01 
R
2  0.11  0.80 nr  0.85  0.87  0.44 nr  0.38 nr  0.02  0.34  0.32 
DW  1.90  1.30 nr  1.33  1.90  2.30 nr  1.69 nr  1.52  1.70  2.02 
nr: not relevant (not enough data).  The country detail for the government balance is not given due to insufficient data. 
α, β and δ: coefficients in the regression St = α + β (Ft – Rt) + δ St-1 + µ  
Signif (.): significance level of the t-statistic of the null hypothesis; numbers below 0.05 indicate that the coefficient is significantly 
different from 0 at the 5 % level. 
 
For the recently acceded Member States as a group, there is some evidence (table 11) that 
budgetary consolidation is the prime concern to the authorities as reflected in the negative 
coefficient for the forecast error, assuming that the coefficient is the same as the one for 
the deviation between the actual budget and the target.  That result for the group as a whole, 
observed both in the Commission services’ forecasts and those of the national authorities, 
is mainly due to the behaviour of the Baltic states.  In the four larger central European 
countries, the positive sign (except Hungary) with the prediction error would indicate that 
there is some attention paid to output stabilisation to the detriment of budgetary 
consolidation.  The concern with the cycle is not significant and making bad growth 
forecasts had less important consequences for the fiscal stance.  However, in these 
countries the budgetary outcome was heavily influenced by discretionary measures related 
to debt assumptions and the role of the growth forecast errors is likely to be underestimated.   
 
In the Baltic states the growth forecast errors appear to matter and the observed 
underestimation led to a tighter fiscal policy in order to ensure meeting the deficit target.  
From this point of view, the underestimation of growth in these countries by the 
Commission services was a “good” error in the sense that it added fiscal restraint.  One 
should, however, not conclude that the fiscal stance was tight enough or appropriate 
because the deficit target may have been unambitious resulting in insufficient output 
stabilisation.  Extrapolation into the future of this benign experience with growth 
underestimation, is also unwarranted to the extent that output stabilisation takes over from 
budgetary consolidation as the prominent policy objective.  Growth underestimation could 
then lead to an easing of fiscal policy with the risk of overheating in the context of the 
strongly growing Baltic economies.  It adds to the risks stemming from incorrectly 
estimating the degree of budgetary restriction because some strongly growing revenues in 
the boom phase (e.g. capital gains or turnover taxes), are in fact not structural in nature 
(Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004)).   
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
The accuracy of projections for the recently acceded Member States has been examined in 
the period 1995 - 2004.  The focus was on the Commission services’ forecasts for GDP 
growth and the general government balance as % of GDP.  In order to have a better 
perspective on the quality of the Commission services’ forecasts, a comparison was made 
with Consensus Forecasts, projections by the national authorities (represented by the pre-
accession economic programmes and the convergence programmes) and predictions made 
by the Commission services for old Member States.  The main findings, which have to be 
interpreted with care due to the limited data set, are as follow: 
 
•  Prediction mistakes for the recently acceded Member States are large and widen 
with the length of the projection horizon.  The mean absolute forecast error by the 
Commission services for GDP growth in the recently acceded Member States is 
about 1.5 % (pooled average) in predictions made in spring for the ongoing year 
(current year forecast), ranging from 0.7 % in Slovenia to 2.71 % in Latvia.  The 
mean absolute error widens to 1.9 % on average for growth predictions made in 
autumn for the following year (year ahead forecasts).   
•  These growth forecast errors are of the same order of magnitude as those made by 
other forecasters.  The mistakes with Consensus Forecasts are smaller, which have 
to seen in the light of differences in timing and forecasting approach.  Similar 
considerations, but in particular, the limitation of the sample to a more recent 
period explain the better performance of the national authorities.  Compared to the 
Commission services’ forecasts for old Member States, the mistakes are about 
double as large.   
•  The mean absolute forecast error (pooled average) made by the Commission 
services for the general government balance in the recently acceded Member States 
is 1.3 % of GDP in the current year (1.4 % of GDP in the year ahead forecast), with 
wide variations across countries.  The national authorities make similar mistakes. 
•  The projections pass in general the conventional tests of absence of bias, efficiency 
and no persistence in the forecast errors.  Growth is usually underestimated by the 
examined forecasters, though not significantly in a statistical sense, in the Baltic 
states, Hungary (to a minor extent) and Slovakia (sometimes statistically 
significant).  In the five other recently acceded Member States, there was a 
tendency to overestimate growth, which was relatively strong in the Czech 
Republic and Malta.  With respect to the government balance, it was generally 
overestimated (not statistically significant) in the Baltic states and Poland, while 
underestimating was the tendency in Malta, Cyprus and Hungary with the three 
other countries closer to the observed result. 
•  The Commission services forecasts are in general also better than a naïve 
extrapolation of last year’s outcome or taking the average as the forecast.  Hence, 
there is no easy way to reduce the admittedly large forecast errors for the new 
Member States.   
•  Volatility and data revisions creating uncertainty about the state of the economy in 
the 10 new countries appear to be the main reasons for the lower forecast 
performance.  Taking this into account, the large forecast errors in the Baltic states 
look normal and the errors in Polish and Slovak GDP forecasts are below what 
could be expected based on the level of volatility in their economies.  With the 
recently more stable economic developments and improved data quality, the future 
looks brighter. 
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Forecast errors in the general government balance are related to growth mistakes through 
the operation of the automatic stabilisers.  An unexpected growth shortfall will lead to an 
unanticipated widening of the government balance because lower than foreseen growth 
reduces revenues and increases expenditure.  However, the largest source for fiscal forecast 
errors are unanticipated budgetary measures and methodological changes.  They represent 
about 80 % of the total error, leaving 20% for the cyclical part. 
 
Although in general, the growth forecast errors are not intentional as there is absence of 
bias in the national authorities’ projections as well as in those of the Commission services, 
the mistakes are big, potentially leading to wrong policy decisions.  This was, however, not 
verified in the sample under examination.  Overall, growth forecast errors in the recently 
acceded Member States impacted significantly on the fiscal stance, but this result was 
mainly due to the Baltic states, where growth underestimation contributed to fiscal restraint 
or less fiscal stimulus and, from that point of view, was a “good” error.  In the other 
countries, the fiscal stance did not appear to be influenced by growth forecast errors in an 
important way as discretionary measures and methodological changes dominated the 
picture.   
 
Extrapolation into the future of the benign experiences with growth forecast errors is 
unwarranted because the period on which the analysis was based is short and probably 
atypical.  In particular, growth underestimation has to be watched in the context of the 
strongly growing Baltic economies.  Growth underestimation is a prudent approach when 
budgetary consolidation is the prominent policy objective, but to the extent that output 
stabilisation takes over, growth underestimation could lead to setting a too easy fiscal 
policy with the risk of overheating.   - 22 - 
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ANNEX A: DATA SOURCES  
 
Publication
a Current year Year ahead Cut-off Press
name forecast outturn forecast outturn date conference
b
1995 Spring Not published 1995
Autumn Not published 1996
1996 No 1, May European Economy - Supplement C 1996 1995
No 3, October European Economy - Supplement C 1997 1995
1997 No 2, June European Economy - Supplement C 1997 1996
No 4, December European Economy - Supplement C 1998 1996
1998 No 2, April European Economy - Supplement C 1998 1997
No 4, November European Economy - Supplement C 1999 1997
1999 No 2, May European Economy - Supplement C 1999 1998
No 4, December European Economy - Supplement C 2000 1998
2000 No 2, May European Economy - Supplement C 2000 1999
No 4, December European Economy - Supplement C 2001 1999 November, 22
2001 No 2, April European Economy - Supplement C 2001 2000 April, 25
No 4, November European Economy - Supplement C 2002 2000 November, 21
2002 No 9, April European Economy - Enlargement Papers 2002 2001 April, 12 April, 24
No 12, November European Economy - Enlargement Papers 2003 2001 November, 4 November, 13
2003 No 15, April European Economy - Enlargement Papers 2003 2002 March, 28 April, 8
No 5/2003 European Economy 2004 2002 October, 20 October, 29
2004 No 2/2004 European Economy 2004 2003 March, 29 April, 7
No 5/2004 European Economy 2005 2003 October, 18 October, 26
2005 No 2/2005 European Economy 2005 2004 2004 March, 16 April, 4
b: From 29 October 2003 joint press release with old Member States.
a: In the beginning, there were no separate forecasts for the new Member States.  The bigger recently acceded countres were covered to the extent there 
were an input for some world aggregates (GDP, international trade).  In European Economy-Enlargement Papers the coverage was larger.  Public 
finance forecasts are available from end 2000.  From end 2003, forecasts for old and new Member States were jointly published in European Economy.
The table  lists from 1995 the available short-term macroeconomic projections made by the Commission services for the recently acceded Member 
States, classified by publication date and indicates where the data for the analysis of the forecast accuracy are taken from.  When available the cut-off 











 ANNEX B: DATA SET  
Table B.1: Real GDP growth rate
General notes:
Czech Rep. Estonia Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Hungary Malta Poland Slovenia Slovakia RAMS The source for the forecasts (F)
F R F R F R F R F R F R F R F R F R F R F R  and realisations (R) is given in
1995 4 . 24 . 85 . 04 . 5 4 . 6 - 1 . 62 . 72 . 50 . 31 . 7 5 . 07 . 04 . 04 . 23 . 07 . 43 . 63 . 8 a n n e x  A .
1996 5 . 54 . 44 . 02 . 3 1 . 22 . 51 . 03 . 62 . 10 . 5 6 . 06 . 14 . 43 . 55 . 56 . 83 . 73 . 7 R A M S :  u n w e i g h t e d  a v e r a g e .
1997 4 . 61 . 13 . 09 . 7 2 . 85 . 94 . 06 . 01 . 54 . 0 6 . 56 . 94 . 23 . 15 . 96 . 24 . 15 . 4
1998 1 . 9 - 2 . 56 . 84 . 0 6 . 33 . 86 . 65 . 04 . 55 . 0 6 . 14 . 83 . 64 . 04 . 45 . 35 . 03 . 7
1999 0.3 -0.5 3.6 -1.4 3.8 0.5 3.6 -4.0 4.0 4.3 3.7 4.1 3.5 3.7 2.1 1.9 3.1 1.1
2000 1 . 83 . 14 . 06 . 6 2 . 55 . 72 . 22 . 94 . 75 . 3 5 . 14 . 24 . 14 . 52 . 22 . 23 . 34 . 3
2001 3 . 53 . 65 . 95 . 43 . 43 . 75 . 57 . 63 . 55 . 94 . 63 . 84 . 3 - 1 . 04 . 31 . 14 . 33 . 03 . 03 . 34 . 23 . 6
2002 3 . 42 . 04 . 05 . 62 . 52 . 05 . 06 . 14 . 05 . 93 . 53 . 33 . 93 . 01 . 41 . 33 . 13 . 03 . 64 . 43 . 43 . 7
2003 2 . 82 . 94 . 94 . 82 . 02 . 05 . 57 . 54 . 58 . 93 . 72 . 93 . 10 . 42 . 53 . 73 . 42 . 33 . 74 . 23 . 64 . 0
2004 2 . 94 . 05 . 46 . 23 . 43 . 76 . 28 . 56 . 96 . 73 . 24 . 01 . 41 . 54 . 65 . 33 . 24 . 64 . 05 . 54 . 15 . 0
Czech Rep. Estonia Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Hungary Malta Poland Slovenia Slovakia RAMS
F R F R F R F R F R F R F R F R F R F R F R 
1995
1996 4 . 44 . 17 . 04 . 0 1 . 12 . 85 . 03 . 62 . 81 . 0 6 . 06 . 15 . 53 . 14 . 76 . 94 . 64 . 0
1997 5 . 31 . 04 . 5 1 1 . 4 2 . 26 . 52 . 75 . 72 . 74 . 4 5 . 16 . 94 . 13 . 84 . 66 . 53 . 95 . 8
1998 2 . 6 - 2 . 34 . 74 . 0 4 . 13 . 65 . 45 . 13 . 85 . 1 4 . 74 . 84 . 33 . 94 . 54 . 44 . 33 . 6
1999 1.3 -0.2 6.3 -1.1 5.7 0.1 5.0 -4.1 3.9 4.5 5.5 4.1 4.0 4.9 3.8 1.9 4.4 1.3
2000 2 . 42 . 94 . 56 . 9 2 . 06 . 62 . 83 . 94 . 25 . 2 5 . 14 . 03 . 64 . 61 . 72 . 23 . 34 . 5
2001 3 . 03 . 36 . 35 . 02 . 84 . 04 . 57 . 73 . 25 . 95 . 53 . 84 . 2 - 0 . 85 . 01 . 04 . 23 . 03 . 13 . 34 . 23 . 6
2002 3 . 82 . 04 . 76 . 03 . 32 . 04 . 56 . 13 . 56 . 73 . 23 . 33 . 31 . 21 . 91 . 43 . 32 . 93 . 54 . 43 . 53 . 6
2003 3 . 23 . 14 . 75 . 13 . 52 . 05 . 57 . 53 . 59 . 74 . 53 . 03 . 40 . 23 . 23 . 83 . 62 . 53 . 94 . 03 . 94 . 1
2004 2 . 64 . 05 . 66 . 23 . 43 . 75 . 28 . 55 . 76 . 73 . 24 . 02 . 71 . 54 . 25 . 33 . 14 . 64 . 15 . 54 . 05 . 0
Table B.2: General Government deficit (% of GDP)
Notes on government balance:
Czech Rep. Estonia Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Hungary Malta Poland Slovenia Slovakia RAMS Hungary: 2004(R) + 0.9
F R F R F R F R F R F R F R F R F R F R F R  corresponding to reclassification 
2001 -9.4 -5.5 0.1 0.2 -3.2 -3.0 -1.9 -1.7 -1.8 -1.7 -3.3 -4.3 -5.6 -7.0 -3.1 -5.6 -1.1 -1.3 -5.4 -5.5 -3.5 -3.5 of pension reform cost.
2002 -6.7 -6.5 0.1 1.3 -2.6 -3.5 -2.8 -2.5 -1.8 -1.8 -4.9 -9.1 -5.5 -6.1 -6.3 -4.2 -1.3 -1.8 -5.0 -7.7 -3.7 -4.2
2003 -6.3 -12.9 -0.5 2.6 -4.0 -6.3 -2.9 -1.8 -1.9 -1.7 -4.9 -5.9 -5.2 -9.7 -4.2 -4.1 -1.5 -1.8 -5.3 -3.6 -3.7 -4.5
2004 -5.9 -3.0 0.7 1.8 -4.6 -4.2 -2.2 -0.8 -2.8 -2.5 -4.9 -5.4 -5.9 -5.2 -6.0 -4.9 -1.7 -1.9 -4.1 -3.3 -3.7 -2.9
Czech Rep. Estonia Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Hungary Malta Poland Slovenia Slovakia RAMS
F R F R F R F R F R F R F R F R F R F R F R 
2001 -4.8 -5.2 0.7 0.5 -3.3 -3.0 -2.8 -1.6 -2.5 -1.9 -3.0 -4.1 -6.3 -7.0 -2.8 -3.9 -1.3 -2.5 -5.5 -5.4 -3.2 -3.4
2002 -7.6 -7.1 0.1 0.9 -2.5 -3.5 -2.2 -3.0 -1.8 -1.7 -3.6 -9.2 -4.7 -6.2 -5.1 -3.9 -1.2 -2.3 -5.0 -7.2 -3.4 -4.3
2003 -6.6 -12.6 -0.3 3.1 -2.1 -6.4 -2.5 -1.5 -1.9 -1.9 -5.7 -6.2 -5.3 -9.6 -4.5 -3.9 -1.3 -2.0 -4.8 -3.7 -3.5 -4.5
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